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Abstract
This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where ex-ante
heterogenous individuals have general payoff functions and vectors of attributes.
The analysis applies to a large class of models, from the non-transferable utility
case to the collective household case with bargaining. The approach is powerful
for it identifies a simple algorithm which, in the empirical application, is found to
rapidly converge to equilibrium. Using indirect inference, we identify the differ-
ential effects of women’s ability and charm on female match incentives. We use
these results to assess the separate impacts of the arrival of equal opportunities
for women in the labor market and the advent of the contraceptive pill on female
economic activity and matching.
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1. Introduction
This paper develops a new equilibrium marriage model of two-sided search where ex-
ante heterogenous individuals have general payoff functions with vectors of attributes.
In the existing search literature, the restriction to a single attribute is almost universal
for the aggregation problem is severe: ex-ante heterogeneous singles use different match
strategies and equilibrium requires that each individual’s strategy must be a best re-
sponse to the aggregated match strategies of the opposite sex. We provide a complete
characterisation of equilibrium and an existence proof when agents have vectors of at-
tributes. Although the paper focuses on the non-transferable utility case (in the sense of
Burdett and Coles [1997]), the arguments apply equally to the collective household case
(e.g., Browning and Chiappori [1998]) for which transferable utility is a special case, and
allows idiosyncratic match draws as first considered in Burdett and Wright (1998). The
approach is powerful for it identifies a simple algorithm which, in the numerical applica-
tion, is found to rapidly converge to equilibrium. We use the framework to provide new
insights on the separate impacts of equal labor market opportunities for women and im-
proved contraceptive technologies on female education choice, labor market participation
rates and marriage.
Following seminal work by Becker (1973, 1974), it has long been established that
partnerships between men and women are positively sorted along many dimensions such
as age, income, education, ethnic origin, health, height, psychometric scores (e.g., Fish-
man et al. 2006; Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely 2010). With frictionless matching, the
existence of stable-match allocations with multiple attributes has long been established
(see Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss [2014] for a useful survey). Given a restriction
to finite types and transferable utility, Choo and Siow (2006) show how observed mar-
riage patterns can be used to exactly identify the gains to marriage, while Galichon and
Salanie (2010) and Dupuy and Galichon (2014) extend that approach to allow a con-
tinuum of types.1 Here instead we consider equilibrium matching with frictions where,
even with modern day internet dating sites, it takes time for singles to find mutually
desired life-partners. An important difference is that when rejecting a potential match,
the agent’s outside option here is to continue search for a preferred partner (rather than
match immediately with someone else or remain permanently unmatched). The resulting
framework simultaneously addresses sorting issues (who marries whom) along with the
1Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2012) construct a model with multiple characteristics,
which however reduces to matching along a one-dimensional index.
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timing of marriage (who marries when).2
There is a large literature on equilibrium search with ex-ante heterogeneous agents.3
By extending that framework to multiple female attributes, we analyse how the arrival
of equal opportunities radically affected not only female economic activity but also part-
nership formation and female welfare. For following the end of World War II, the U.S.
witnessed dramatic changes in the labor market. Figure 1 illustrates the post 1950s surge
in female labor market participation rates, especially those of young married women with
children.4 With household production increasingly sustained by new labor-saving appli-
ances, a doubling of real wages from the mid 1930s to 1960 and with their children
safely at school, women in the 1960s had an ever increasing incentive to switch more of
their time to the booming labor market (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005;
Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005).5 Greenwood et al. (2016) use a search and
matching framework to argue that changes in home production technologies (the engines
of liberation) were the primary factor for increased female labor market participation fol-
lowing the 1960s. In contrast using occupational choice data, Hsieh et al (2016) argue
that college discrimination was the major factor in generating inefficient labor market
outcomes. Kessler-Harris (1982, 2001) and Goldin (1990, 1991) instead describe how
“marriage bars” were commonly used in professions such as doctors, lawyers, teachers
and clerks, to block the employment prospects of married women. Indeed, although the
Civil Rights Act became law in 1964 and so made discrimination against women illegal,
it was only in 1970 that the Supreme Court finally ruled it illegal for firms to discriminate
against women with children (Kessler-Harris 1982). Here we refer to the combination of
technological improvements in the home (which freed women from domestic chores), the
opening of university doors to women, the labor market legislative reforms (culminating
in the 1963 Equal Pay Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act) and the underlying political
and cultural environment in which they were conceived (such as the Commission on the
2The only two existing equilibrium search papers with multiple attributes are by Coles and
Francesconi (2011) and Lindenlaub and Postel-Vinay (2016).
3The marriage approach typically assumes non-transferable utility. See, for example, Lu and McAfee
(1996), Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999), Eeckhout (1999), Bloch and Ryder (2000), Chade (2001), Chade
and Ventura (2002), Smith (2006), Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings (2010), Coles and Francesconi (2011),
and Dı´az-Gime´nez and Giolito (2013). The labor market context instead assumes utility is transferable
with Nash bargaining over the wage paid; see for example Shimer and Smith (2000).
4The data used to construct the figure and employed in the empirical application are described in
the Appendix. We shall come back to Figure 1 in Section 3.
5Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) describe how the development of infant formula and improved medi-
cation freed the nursing mother from the home. Among the studies that emphasize a positive impact of
wartime work on women’s subsequent employment, see Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004), Goldin and
Olivetti (2013), and Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz (2014).
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Status of Women, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the growth of
feminism), as “the arrival of equal opportunities for women”.6
In our framework male preferences over female partners depend not only on female
talent and ability, but also on other characteristics such as (potential) inheritance (Stone
1977), physical beauty (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 1992), pizzazz (Burdett and
Coles 1997), or nurturing skills (Goldin and Katz 2002). In the application we assume
women are described by a pair, ability and charm, where “ability” describes her earnings
capabilities in the labor market while “charm” is assumed a non-productive asset in the
labour market but is valuable in the marriage market. We further suppose the arrival of
equal opportunities for women in the 1960s had a large, direct impact on the return to
female ability (women now have real career options) while having relatively little impact
on female charm in the marriage market. To address the impact of the introduction
of the pill, we reconsider Goldin and Katz’s (2002) argument that, by increasing the
flow return to being single, the pill encouraged single women to delay marriage and so
increased their incentive to invest in a college education.
An added contribution is we show how to identify the model using indirect inference.
In the frictionless matching approach, Choo and Siow (2006) show how the fraction of
individuals who marry by type can be used to identify the returns to marriage. With
frictional matching, instead, the relevant metric is the hazard rate into marriage. Fur-
thermore because unobserved heterogeneity causes the estimated hazard rate to decline
with age, we show how indirect inference on estimated hazard functions by educational
choice can separately identify the impacts of female charm and female ability on match
outcomes and payoffs.7
An important insight is we show how a “family tax” plays a central role in explaining
equilibrium match formation. Raising a two-child family is expensive: standard equiv-
alence scales imply a family of four on joint income Y enjoys the equivalent lifestyle as
a single on income 0.48Y . From the single female’s point of view then, entering a part-
nership to raise two children implies a direct 52% family tax on her own income (plus
whatever income her partner brings to the match). This tax on own earnings implies
high earning women are very selective in their search for a life-partner. In contrast,
6The change in public policies and attitudes to the employment of married women with children had
a tremendous impact on female behavior, occupations, and earnings (Beller 1982; Harrison 1988; Rosen
2000). Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) find evidence that attitudes of men brought up in families
in which the mother worked played a significant role in the increase in female labor force participation
over time. See also Costa (2000) and Goldin (2006).
7Lise and Robin (2014) and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2016) also use hazard functions as iden-
tifying information though in a labor market context.
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female charm is neither taxed in the marriage nor pays the bills while single. It does,
however, attract more potential partners. With non transferable utility and search fric-
tions, more charming women extract greater surplus from the marriage market by being
suitably selective over prospective partners.8 Although in general the impact of charm
on female match rates is ambiguous, indirect inference finds more charming woman, on
average, match more quickly to sooner enjoy those added marital rents. Because charm
and ability have very different effects on female match incentives, we show how the ar-
rival of equal opportunities radically affected not only female economic activity but also
partnership formation and female welfare.
We also consider the role that contraceptive innovations play in shaping female labor
market outcomes. An influential literature has asked how the diffusion of the pill in
the 1960s affected female economic activity (see for example Goldin and Katz [2002]
and Bailey [2006, 2010]). As pointed out in all such studies, however, it is hard to
identify separately the effect of the pill from other contemporary effects, such as the
feminist movement and, more generally, the emergence of equal opportunities for women.
Our argument here is that the impact of the pill on female college attendance is best
considered an interaction effect: given the arrival of equal opportunities for women,
how did the pill innovation additionally increase female education rates? For prior to
the arrival of equal opportunities, women had no (or very little) incentive to invest
in a college education. Indeed following the 1919 discovery of a new latex production
technology, within 14 years the top ten U.S. condom manufacturers were producing and
selling 1.44 million latex condoms per day (Tone 2001), yet this major contraceptive
innovation had no significant impact on female education rates and economic activity in
the 1920s.
Given equal opportunities, the calibrated model finds it is not enough to argue the
pill increased female education rates by increasing the flow value of being single. If
anything, results suggest that any pill which makes single life relatively more fun would
seem to reduce college attendance. To argue that the pill increases college attendance,
one instead has to identify mechanisms by which it subsidises the cost of education.
For example one might argue that school leavers in the 1960s sought long-term partners
from age 18, while college graduates could not seek long term partners until after they
graduated. In that case the cost of education must also include the cost of deferred
8In contrast, with transferable utility and frictionless matching, single women extract a marital
side-payment which fully compensates them for the value of their charms to men.
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marital search.9 By increasing the flow value of single life, the pill reduces the flow
surplus to marital search which then acts as a subsidy on college attendance. Although
this subsidy might be small, the calibrated model finds small subsidies on education
costs have reasonably large effects on female college attendance.
The next section describes the general equilibrium marriage model of two-sided search
with multiple attributes and idiosyncratic match draws for two cases: (i) non-transferable
utility and (ii) the collective household model. Section 3 develops our substantive appli-
cation which examines how equal opportunities in the labor market and innovations in
contraception affect female economic activity and matching by type. This section also
uses indirect inference to estimate parameter values and discuss many empirical results
and insights. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix provides a full description of the census
and survey data used in the empirical analysis.
2. The Model
2.1 The Case with Non-Transferable Utility (NTU)
We consider a continuous-time, infinite horizon family formation model with frictions
and non-transferable utility. Only steady state equilibria are considered. There are two
sexes, male and female (indexed by s = m, f respectively) and a continuum of agents
of both sexes. All partnerships involve one man and one woman and there is an equal
measure of unpartnered men and women in the singles market. The parameter λ > 0
denotes the rate at which any single meets a potential partner of the opposite sex. For
simplicity all agents are infinitely lived, discount the future at rate r > 0 and partnerships
last forever (no divorce).
Each male is described by a vector of characteristics xm ∈ Ωm, and each female
by vector xf ∈ Ωf . Should a male xm match with a female xf , the male obtains
payoff Um(xm, xf ) + θ
m/r, while the female enjoys payoff Uf (xm, xf ) + θ
f/r. The
partners’ attribute-dependent payoffs Um(·) and Uf (·) are assumed bounded for all
(xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm × Ωf ). The θm,θf terms describe idiosyncratic “love” draws, consid-
ered as independent random draws from exogenous c.d.f. H(·). Note we do not rule out
mass points in H and so allow that H(·) may be degenerate. What is essential is that the
surplus function S(θ˜) =
∫∞
θ˜
[1−H(θ)]dθ exists, which is a positive, continuous, decreasing
function with limθ˜→∞ S(θ˜) = 0. The flow payoff while single is um(xm) ≥ 0 for males and
9Of course it might be argued instead that college life offers additional dating opportunities.
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uf (xf ) ≥ 0 for females, which are also bounded functions for all (xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm × Ωf ).
Let Gm(xm) describe the distribution of male attributes xm across single men and
Gf (xf ) the distribution of female attributes xf . There are search frictions and contacts
are random. Should single male xm meet a single woman, her attributes xf are considered
a random draw from Gf (·). Similarly from her perspective, his attributes xm are a
random draw from Gm(·). Given a contact, each observes the other’s attributes and
draw their independent love values (θm or θf ). A match is formed only if both agree to
it, otherwise they separate and continue search.
If two singles agree to form a match, they permanently exit the singles market and
have two children, a son who inherits his father’s characteristics xm, and a daughter
who inherits her mother’s characteristics xf . As we only consider steady states, there
is no further loss in generality by assuming each child instantaneously grows up and
immediately enters the singles market. Burdett and Coles (1999) refer to this as the
‘clones assumption’.10 The clones assumption is convenient for it usefully abstracts
from inter-cohort competition for partners: the decision to form a match and exit the
pool of singles does not affect the match opportunities of the remaining singles.11 The
approach is relevant for the birth cohort distribution is then endogenously determined.
For example types who never marry, and so do not have children, are absent from the
birth cohort. Conversely, those who match quickly are over-represented in the birth
cohort (and in the general population).
Strategies and Values
Let V m(xm) denote the expected lifetime payoff of a single male with attributes xm using
an optimal matching strategy. V f (xf ) denotes the corresponding value of a single female
with characteristics xf . Given contact with female xf , a male xm will propose a long
term relationship if and only if his match payoff Um(xm, xf ) + θ
m/r exceeds the value of
remaining single V m(xm). His optimal proposal strategy thus has the reservation love
property: the single male will propose if and only if θm ≥ θ˜m where
θ˜m = r
[
V m(xm)− Um(xm, xf )
]
,
10An alternative is to assume each child’s attribute is a mix of his/her parent’s characteristics plus
a random element. Similarly, one might wish to endogenize the fertility choice. Both extensions are
potentially important research projects, but go beyond the scope of the current paper.
11This assumption parallels that of the frictionless approach where the set of unmatched agents is
exogenous.
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and θ˜m = θ˜m(xf |xm) is type specific. We define the male proposal propensity as
Pm(xf |xm) = 1−H(θ˜m), (1)
which, given a contact, is the probability male xm will propose to female xf .
By symmetry, given contact with male xm, single female xf has reservation love value
θ˜f (xm|xf ) given by
θ˜f = r
[
V f (xf )− Uf (xf , xm)
]
,
and the female proposal propensity is then
P f (xm|xf ) = 1−H(θ˜f ). (2)
Given proposal propensities (1) and (2), we can now determine the set of values V s(·)
for all xs ∈ Ωs, s = m, f . Recall that at rate λ each single male meets a potential
female partner whose traits xf are a random draw from Gf (·). Standard arguments
imply V m(xm) is identified by the Bellman equation:
rV m(xm) = um(xm) + λ
∫
xf∈Ωf
Πm(xm, xf )P
f (xm|xf )dGf (xf ),
where
Πm(xm, xf ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
max
[
Um(xm, xf ) + θ
m/r − V m(xm), 0
]
dH(θm). (3)
In words, random matching implies λP f (xm|xf )dGf (xf ) is the rate male xm contacts a
single female of type xf ∈ Ωf who is willing to match with him. Given such a contact, he
then makes expected surplus Πm(xm, xf ) depending on whether his realised match payoff
Um(·) + θm/r exceeds V m(·). Integrating (3) by parts implies Πm(xm, xf ) = S(θ˜m)/r,
where θ˜m is his reservation love value and S(.) is the surplus function. Hence V m(xm) is
the solution to the implicit function
rV m = um(xm) +
λ
r
∫
xf∈Ωf
S
(
r
[
V m − Um(xm, xf )
] )
P f (xm|xf )dGf (xf ). (4)
Thus given xm and female proposal strategies P
f (·) ∈ [0, 1], (4) determines V m =
V m(xm). The right hand side of (4) is positive at V
m = 0 and the properties of the surplus
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function S(.) imply the right hand side is a continuous decreasing function which limits
to um(xm) as V
m → ∞. It follows that V m(xm) always exists, is unique, and satisfies
V m(xm) ≥ um(xm)/r. Note this argument does not imply Vm(.) is a continuous function
for P f (.) need not be continuous in xm; see for example the equilibrium class structure
in Burdett and Coles (1997). Fortunately continuity of Vm(.) is not necessary for the
existence proof.
By symmetry, V f = V f (xf ) is given by
rV f = uf (xf ) +
λ
r
∫
xm∈Ωm
S
(
r
[
V f − Uf (xf , xm)
] )
Pm(xf |xm)dGm(xm). (5)
Equations (4) and (5) thus uniquely determine V m(xm), V
f (xf ) for all (xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm×
Ωf ) given the proposal propensities of the opposite sex. Of course equilibrium requires
that these proposal propensities are consistent with the set of values V m(xm), V
f (xf ).
Before defining and establishing the existence of equilibrium, it is useful first to detail
how changes in proposal strategies affect agent values. Specifically, consider a woman xf
and two different proposal strategies by men, Pm1 (·) and Pm0 (·). Let V f1 (xf ) and V f0 (xf )
denote the solutions to (5) with Pm being equal to Pm1 and P
m
0 , respectively.
Lemma 1. If Pm1 (xf |xm) ≥ Pm0 (xf |xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm, then V f1 (xf ) ≥ V f0 (xf ).
Lemma 1 simply says that a woman xf is better off when all men are more likely to
propose to her. The result follows immediately from (5): for any given V f and noting
the surplus function is positive, the right hand side of this equation is increasing in Pm.
Thus V f solving (5) must increase with an increase in Pm.
We can now identify an upper bound for values V s. Lemma 1 implies the ideal
situation for each male xm is that all women propose with probability one; i.e., P
f = 1
for all xf ∈ Ωf . Now consider his ideal match x∗f defined as
x∗f (xm) = arg max
xf∈Ωf
Um(xm, xf ).
It follows that V m(xm) ≤ V m(xm), where
rV
m
= um(xm) +
λ
r
S
(
r
[
V
m − Um(xm, x∗f )
] )
, (6)
for V
m
describes the value of being single in a market where all women propose and every
woman is also his ideal match. The assumptions on S(·) guarantee that V m defined by
9
(6) exists and V
m ≥ um(xm)/r. We have thus established the following result.
Lemma 2. For any male xm ∈ Ωm and female proposal strategies P f (·) ∈ [0, 1], the
solution for V m(xm) exists, is unique, and is bounded with
V m(xm) ∈
[um(xm)
r
, V
m
(xm)
]
.
Armed with Lemmas 1 and 2, we are now in a position to define and establish the
existence of an equilibrium. The definition of a Matching Equilibrium simply requires
the sets of values V m(·) and V f (·) are consistent with the proposal propensities Pm and
P f of the opposite sex, while those proposal propensities Pm and P f are optimal given
V m and V f .
Definition of a Matching Equilibrium (NTU): Equilibrium is the set of functions
{Pm, P f , V m, V f} over (xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm × Ωf ) which satisfy the functional equations
(1)–(2) and (4)–(5).
Existence is established by considering the following fixed point. Suppose V mk (·) =
V m(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm describes the equilibrium set of male values. Equation (1) then
implies equilibrium male proposal propensities
Pmk (xf |xm) = 1−H
(
r[V mk (xm)− Um(xm, xf )]
)
, (7)
for each xm ∈ Ωm. Given these male proposal propensities Pmk (·) ∈ [0, 1], the Bellman
equation (5) then uniquely yields V f (xf ) for each xf ∈ Ωf . Let V fk (·) denote this
solution. Given V f = V fk (·), equation (2) then yields female proposal propensities
P fk (·) = 1−H
(
r[V fk (xf )− Uf (xf , xm)]
)
. (8)
Of course given these female proposal propensities P fk (·) ∈ [0, 1], (4) then uniquely
determines V m(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm. Let V mk+1(·) denote this updated solution. This
identifies a functional mapping V mk+1(xm) = T [V
m
k (xm)] and equilibrium corresponds to
its fixed point V m(xm) = T [V
m(xm)] for all xm ∈ Ωm. The existence proof uses the
following monotonicity property.
Lemma 3. [Monotonicity] If V mk (xm) ≥ V mk+1(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm, then T [V mk (xm)] ≥
T [V mk+1(xm)] for all xm ∈ Ωm.
Proof. As H(·) is an increasing function, V mk (xm) ≥ V mk+1(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm and (7)
implies Pmk (·) ≤ Pmk+1(·) for all xm ∈ Ωm, xf ∈ Ωf . Lemma 1 establishes V fk (.) ≤ V fk+1(.)
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for all xf ∈ Ωf . As H(·) is an increasing function, V fk (·) ≤ V fk+1(·) for all xf ∈ Ωf and
(8) implies P fk (·) ≥ P fk+1(·) for all xf ∈ Ωf , xm ∈ Ωm. Lemma 1 establishes T [V mk (xm)] ≥
T [V mk+1(xm)] for all xm ∈ Ωm and so the map T [·] is monotonic. 
The proof of Lemma 3 reflects the following structure. When all single men are better
off, each man becomes more selective in the marriage market: given a contact with a
single woman, each male proposes with a lower probability. Lemma 1 then implies every
single woman is worse off for it is harder to find a male who is willing to form a permanent
partnership. Now when all single women are worse off, each becomes less selective in the
marriage market and their proposal propensities increase. Lemma 1 then implies every
single man is better off. These feedback effects suggest multiple equilibria may occur
where men, say, prefer an equilibrium in which women are less selective (and men more
selective) while women prefer another equilibrium in which men are less selective (and
women more selective). The proof of Lemma 3, however, shows this feedback mechanism
also implies monotonicity of the map T [V ]. Establishing existence of an equilibrium is
now straightforward.
Theorem 1. A Matching Equilibrium exists.
Proof. Existence follows by repeated iteration of the map V mk+1(xm) = T [V
m
k (xm)], start-
ing at the upper bound V m0 (·) = V m(·). As V m1 (xm) = T [V m0 (xm)] ≤ V m(xm) for all
xm ∈ Ωm, Lemma 3 and an induction argument imply a sequence of decreasing values
V mk+1(xm) ≤ V mk (xm) for each xm ∈ Ωm, k = 0, 1, 2, ... As this sequence is bounded below
by um(xm)/r, a limit point exists for every xm ∈ Ωm. As this limiting set of values is
the required fixed point, an equilibrium must exist. This completes the proof of the
Theorem. 
The proof of Theorem 1 identifies a simple algorithm by which we can numerically
compute matching equilibria. Indeed there are clear parallels with the original algorithm
by Gale and Shapley (1962). That algorithm identifies stable match allocations by
describing how women make acceptance decisions given the current set of male proposals,
and the algorithm sequentially updates the set of male proposal choices given those
acceptance rules. Here instead with search frictions, matching equilibria are identified
by sequentially updating on agent values, which then determine proposal strategies. An
added parallel is that if there are two equilibria where, say, all men prefer equilibrium
1 to equilibrium 2, then monotonicity of the map T [V ] implies iteration starting with
V m0 (·) = V m (i.e., men extract full marital surplus in the first step) will converge to
equilibrium 1, while iteration starting with V m0 (·) = um(·)/r (i.e., women extract full
marital surplus in the first step) will converge to equilibrium 2.
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In the next section we describe a particular application of this framework. Before
doing that, however, we quickly show how this iterative algorithm also identifies equi-
librium in the collective household case (e.g., Chiappori 1992; Browning and Chiappori
1998).
2.2 Matching Equilibrium with Collective Households
Consider a household (xm, xf , θ) which takes actions z ∈ Z which are jointly efficient.
Because frictions imply marital surplus may be strictly positive, an equilibrium frame-
work must describe how that surplus is shared. As is standard, we adopt the Nash
bargaining approach where partners (xm, xf , θ) choose z to solve
max
z∈Z
[
U1(z|xm, xf , θ)− V m
]α [
U2(z|xm, xf , θ)− V f
]1−α
, (9)
where U1(·), U2(·) are the respective male and female payoffs within the match given
actions z. The threatpoints (V m, V f ) are the agents’ respective values of remaining
single, where α = 1 implies the male appropriates all of the match surplus while α = 0
implies the female appropriates all the match surplus. Thus α ∈ [0, 1] parameterises the
male share of any match surplus.
An equivalent but more convenient representation is to define the partners’ “utility
production possibility frontier”, i.e. given any partnership (xm, xf , θ), define the Pareto
frontier Um = Υ(U f |xm, xf , θ), where
Um = max
z∈Z
U1(z|xm, xf , θ) subject to U2(z|xm, xf , θ) ≥ U f .
If the Pareto frontier Υ(·|xm, xf , θ) is not concave (e.g. there may be indivisibilities in
the choice set Z), lotteries are then optimal (e.g. partners take turns to take out the
trash), in which case we consider the convex hull of Υ(·|xm, xf , θ) which is concave. Note
the transferable utility case arises when U1(·), U2(·) imply Υ(·|xm, xf , θ) is linear in U f ;
see Chiappori and Weiss (2007) for an example with marital public goods (children).
With this equivalent formulation in hand then, whenever a gain to trade exists,
realised marital payoffs (U˜m, U˜ f ) solve
(U˜m, U˜ f ) = arg max
(Um,Uf )
[Um − V m]α [U f − V f]1−α (10)
subject to Um = Υ(U f |xm, xf , θ).
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Although concavity ensures Υ(·) is piecewise differentiable in U f , for ease of exposition
we assume it is continuously differentiable. In that case (10) implies female marital
payoff U˜ f = U˜ f (xm, xf , θ, V
m, V f ) satisfies the first order condition
αΥ′(U˜ f |·)
[
U˜ f − V f
]
+ (1− α)[Υ(U˜ f |·)− V m] = 0 (11)
when U˜ f ≥ V f (otherwise there is no gain to trade and the match dissolves). Given this
solution for U˜ f , the male obtains marital payoff
U˜m = Υ(U˜ f |xm, xf , θ). (12)
Of course the threatpoints V m = V m(xm), V
f = V f (xf ) are, in equilibrium, deter-
mined by optimal search while single. We describe equilibrium search below. Anticipat-
ing the fixed point argument, however, we first describe how marital payoffs (U˜m, U˜ f )
vary with exogenous threatpoints (V m, V f ).
Lemma 4. Should a gain to trade exist, that is U˜ f (xm, xf , θ, V
m, V f ) > V f , then:
(i) 0 ≤ ∂U˜f
∂V f
≤ 1: the female partner negotiates a higher payoff should her threat point
increase, and
(ii) ∂U˜
f
∂Vm
≤ 0: the female partner negotiates a lower payoff should her partner’s threat
point increase.
The equivalent statement applies for U˜m.
Proof. The proof is a trivial comparative static exercise on (11), where Υ(·) must be
concave. 
We can now describe a Matching Equilibrium for the Collective Households case.
Consider a single male xm ∈ Ωm and suppose in equilibrium he enjoys value V m =
V m(xm) while single. If he contacts woman xf with value V
f = V f (xf ) and if match draw
θ implies a gain to trade exists, he negotiates marital payoff U˜m(xm, xf , θ, V
m, V f (xf )) ≥
V m as determined by (11)-(12). Conversely if realised θ implies there is no gain to trade,
the two separate and continue search. Thus given the set of equilibrium female values
V f (.), standard arguments imply V m = V m(xm) solves the Bellman equation:
rV m = um(xm)+λ
∫
xf∈Ωf
Eθ
[
max[U˜m(xm, xf , θ, V
m, V f (xf ))− Vm, 0
]
dGf (xf ). (13)
Equation (13) is an implicit function for V m = V m(xm). As Lemma 4 implies ∂U˜
m/∂V m
≤ 1, the right hand side of (13) is positive, continuous, decreasing in Vm and limits to
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um(xm) as V
m → ∞. Thus V m = V m(xm) exists, is unique, and satisfies V m(xm) ≥
um(xm)/r.
By symmetry, V f = V f (xf ) solves the Bellman equation
rV f = uf (xf ) + λ
∫
xm∈Ωm
Eθ max[U˜
f (xm, xf , θ|V m(xm), V f )− V f , 0]dGm(xm), (14)
which also exists, is unique, and satisfies V f (xm) ≥ uf (xf )/r.
We maintain the assumption that all couples have two children who are identical to
the parents. The birth cohort is thus endogenously determined while the distributions
of singles Gm and Gf are independent of agent match strategies.
Definition of a Matching Equilibrium (Collective Households): Equilibrium is
the set of marital payoffs and values {U˜m, U˜ f , V m, V f} for all (xm, xf ) ∈ (Ωm×Ωf ) such
that:
(i) whenever a gain to trade exists, {U˜m, U˜ f} satisfy (11),(12) with V m = V m(xm),
V f = V f (xf ), and
(ii) V m = V m(xm), V
f = V f (xf ) satisfy the functional equations (13)–(14) with
{U˜m, U˜ f} given by (i).
Because the same fixed point argument applies, we quickly sketch the relevant details.
As before let V mk (·) = V m(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm describe the equilibrium set of male
values. With V m(·) = V mk (·), (10) and (14) determine V f (xf ) for each xf ∈ Ωf and the
above has established a solution exists, is unique with V f (xm) ≥ uf (xf )/r. Let V fk (·)
denote this set of values. With V f (·) = V fk (·), (10) and (13) now uniquely determine
V m(xm) for each xm ∈ Ωm. Let V mk+1(·) denote the updated set of values. This identifies
a functional map V mk+1(·) = T [V mk (·)], where its fixed point V m(·) = T [V m(·)] describes
the matching equilibrium.
The same argument establishes monotonicity of the map T [V m(·)]. Consider any two
sets of male values V m(xm) for xm ∈ Ωm, denoted V mk (·) and V mk+1(·) where V mk (xm) ≥
V mk+1(xm) for all xm ∈ Ωm. Consider any female xf ∈ Ωf and note Lemma 4 implies
∂U˜ f/∂V m ≤ 0, i.e. a female negotiates a lower payoff the greater her partner’s threat-
point. It is then immediate that if all men have higher values V mk (·) ≥ V mk+1(·), the
corresponding fall in U˜ f in (14) implies V f must be lower; that is V fk (xf ) ≤ V fk+1(xf )
for all xf ∈ Ωf . By symmetry it then follows that if all women have lower threatpoints
V fk (xf ) ≤ V fk+1(xf ) for all xf ∈ Ωf , then each male negotiates a higher payoff U˜m in
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any match. Thus we have T [V mk (xm)] ≥ T [V mk+1(xm)] for all xm ∈ Ωm and so T (.) is
monotonic.
Establishing existence requires ensuring payoffs are bounded. The lower bound for
female payoffs is uf (xf )/r for women can always choose not to marry. Putting V
f =
uf (xf )/r now implies the upper bound of male values, denoted V
m
(xm), is the solution
to the Bellman equation
rV
m
= um(xm) + λ
∫
xf∈Ωf
Eθ max[U˜
m(xm, xf , θ|V m, uf (xf )/r)− V m, 0]dGf (xf ).
Because Lemma 4 establishes [U˜m(.) − V m] is decreasing in V m for V m ≥ um(xm)/r,
it follows that assuming Eθ[U˜
m(xm, xf , θ|um(xm)/r, uf (xf )/r)] is uniformly bounded for
all (xm, xf ) ∈ Ωm × Ωf is sufficient to ensure this upper bound V m exists. As this
also implies V
m
(xm) ≥ um(xm)/r, then setting V m0 (·) = V m(·) and iterating, the map
V mk+1(·) = T [V mk (·)] yields a decreasing sequence of functions V mk (·). Since this sequence
of functions is bounded below by um(xm)/r, the limiting function must exist and identifies
a Matching Equilibrium.
3. Application: Equal Opportunities and the Pill
Because the data used contains no information on household choices, we adopt the NTU
approach. To focus on female behavior, we keep the male side of the market deliberately
simple. Each male is characterized by a scalar, xm ≡ y, which describes his labor market
earnings. Earnings across single men have distribution Gm(·) and support [y, y]. We
instead suppose women have two attributes (n, α), where n describes her innate charm
to men and α is an ability variable that describes her potential earnings in the labor
market.
This heterogeneity structure allows us to consider how marital incentives and out-
comes changed across the arrival of equal opportunities for women. Prior to the arrival
of equal opportunities, we presume married women with children had highly restricted
labor market opportunities. This has important implications for the marriage market
since single men then put greater emphasis on seeking more charming partners, rather
than high ability ones. The second scenario instead supposes the arrival of equal oppor-
tunities allows more able (high α) women to earn higher wages in the labour market.
This not only changes the (ex-post) labor market opportunities of women with children,
and thus the ex-ante education choices of young women, it also changes the timing and
15
structure of partnership formation. In this way we address how the advent of equal
opportunities not only affected female economic activity but also marital outcomes.
We also follow Goldin and Katz (2002) and consider the impact of the pill on edu-
cation choice by assuming that the pill increased the flow payoff of being single relative
to the flow payoff of being married. Using a two period model, Goldin and Katz (2002)
argue that by reducing the cost to delaying marriage, the pill increased the return to
female education. Our extended framework allows a richer analysis.
3.1 Model
Let G˜f (·) denote the ex-ante distribution of attributes (n, α) across single women. Prior
to entering the marriage market, each woman (n, α) makes an education choice e ∈ {0, 1}
with e = 1 indicating university education and e = 0 otherwise. For convenience we refer
to those who choose e = 1 as college educated, those with e = 0 are college uneducated.
The cost of education c > 0 is the same for all.
Given her education choice e and attributes (n, α), her wage w earned in the labor
market is: (i) w = y if there are unequal labor market opportunities, (ii) w = α if there
are equal opportunities and e = 0 (uneducated), (iii) w = γα if there are equal opportu-
nities and e = 1 (educated), where γ > 1 describes the wage return to education. Given
the sunk education choice, each woman in the marriage market is then described by ex-
post characteristics (n,w). Hence given the ex-ante distribution of female characteristics
G˜f (n, α), the education choices of women yield Gf (n,w) defined as the distribution of
ex-post female attributes (n,w) in the marriage market.
Family consumption is assumed to be a joint public good and labor supply is jointly
efficient. A match between male y and female (n,w) yields the following lifetime payoffs:
Um =
β [y + max[w − φ, 0]] + n+ F
r
; U f =
β [y + max[w − φ, 0]] + F
r
, (15)
where β, φ, and F are positive parameters. The male’s flow payoff in the match depends
on joint labor market earnings y+ max[w−φ, 0] where φ describes the opportunity cost
of child care, i.e., the female partner continues in the labor market if her earnings w ≥ φ.
We assume φ > y, so that a married woman who only earns y will not participate in the
labor market and so becomes a “homemaker”. Conversely, a high earning woman with
w > φ will participate and purchase child services at cost φ.12 Joint earnings are deflated
12An alternative specification, as considered in Coles and Francesconi (2011), is that the higher earner
participates in the labor market, while the lower earner only works if the added earnings compensate
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by β ∈ (0, 1]. Given a family size of two adults and two children, the case β = 1 assumes
“four can live as cheaply as one”. β < 1 instead acts as a “family tax”: the single
man who enjoys flow earnings y only enjoys consumption flow value βy when married
with children, though with an additional income boost of βmax[w − φ, 0] depending on
his partner’s earnings. F describes the additional flow utility enjoyed by marrying and
raising a family.13
The female match payoff U f (·) has an identical structure, the only difference being
that her match payoff does not depend directly on her own charm n. An interesting
motivation for this preference structure is that males might value future daughter happi-
ness. Because daughter happiness will depend on her own charm, the clones assumption
implies males seek more charming wives. In contrast, the clones assumption instead
implies a charming woman automatically raises a charming daughter. For her the ad-
ditional value of her charms is that she can attract a more desirable male y, and her
son will then also be a high y. For simplicity we do not consider such intergenerational
payoffs.14
The flow payoff of a single male is um(y) = y+ u, whereas the flow payoff to a single
woman is uf (n,w) = w + u which depends on their earnings while single. Following
Goldin and Katz (2002), we assume improved contraception raises u, the flow value
of being single relative to the flow value of marriage; that is, improved contraception
reduces the cost to delaying partnership formation.
Matching Equilibria with Unequal Opportunities
According to this structure, prior to the arrival of equal opportunities a woman can only
earn wage y in the labor market which might be considered an extreme version of the
“marriage bar”. As child care costs φ > y, each married woman with children withdraws
from the labor market to become a homemaker and match payoffs (15) simplify to
Um =
βy + n+ F
r
; U f =
βy + F
r
. (16)
Because these payoffs do not depend on female ability α, men value potential female
partners purely by charm n. Because this structure implies a zero female return to
for child care costs.
13Allowing F to be gender specific and idiosyncratic is potentially important, but this is an extension
left to future research.
14For a model with intergenerational payoffs, see Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) on the value of
aristocracy, an inherited asset with no intrinsic value but which can be prized in a matching equilibrium.
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education, young women do not invest in a costly college education.
Let V m(y) denote the value of a single male with income y and V f (n) denote the
value of a single female with charm n. The analysis for the general case now applies.
Given contact with female n, a single male y has θ˜m = rV m(y) − βy − n − F and thus
proposal propensity
Pm(n|y) = 1−H(rV m(y)− βy − n− F ). (17)
Similarly, given contact with male y, a single female n has reservation love value θ˜f =
rV f (n)− βy − F and corresponding proposal propensity
P f (y|n) = 1−H(rV f (n)− βy − F ). (18)
Given (18), the single male y enjoys value V m = V m(y) satisfying
rV m = u+ y +
λ
r
∫ n
n
S(rV m − βy − n− F )P f (y|n)dGf (n), (19)
where Gf (n) describes the distribution of charm across single women. Likewise, the
single female n enjoys value V f = V f (n) satisfying
rV f = u+ y +
λ
r
∫ y
y
S(rV f − βy − F )Pm(n|y)dGm(y). (20)
A Matching Equilibrium is the set of functions {Pm, P f , V m, V f} satisfying the func-
tional equations (17)–(20). Theorem 1 establishes a Matching Equilibrium exists.
Matching Equilibria with Equal Opportunities
With the arrival of equal opportunities, the payoff structure (15) implies female invest-
ment in education generates two benefits. First, it yields a better standard of living, both
while single and when married (if w > φ). Second, it affects her marital options. To sepa-
rate out these two effects, it is useful to define female “fitness” z as z = n+βmax[w−φ, 0]
for then the male and female match payoffs can be written as
Um =
βy + z + F
r
; U f =
βy + βmax[w − φ, 0] + F
r
. (21)
Because men rank women according to fitness z, rather than charm n, it is convenient
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to relabel each female (n,w) by her equivalent characteristics (z, w).
Given the distribution of male earnings Gm(y) and ex-post female characteristics
Gf (z, w), it is easy to formulate the value function for each sex, obtain the corresponding
proposal propensities and use Theorem 1 to establish existence of a Matching Equilib-
rium. Of course we must in addition describe an investment equilibrium where, given
the matching equilibrium, each female (n, α) makes a privately optimal education choice
which endogenously maps female characteristics (n, α) to ex-post attributes (z, w). As
detailed in Burdett and Coles (2001), these investment incentives are not efficient be-
cause women who invest in education ignore that by becoming more selective in the
singles market they make some single men worse off. There is also a standard hold-up
problem.
3.2 Indirect Inference
Maintained Baseline Parameters and Distributional Assumptions
Table 1 describes the baseline parameter values and functional forms. All have a standard
annual discount rate of r = 4%. Because (F −u) describes the net increase in flow utility
through starting a family, we can normalize u = 0. Childcare costs, φ, are set at $10,732
per year for two children. This figure comes from the estimate of child care expenditures
of 19.9% of female yearly personal income per child by Macartney and Laughlin (2011;
Table 2). With an average personal labor income of $26,964 from the 2000 Census
($21,750 for the 75% low education women and $41,350 for the 25% college educated
women), this estimate leads to annual child care costs of $5,366 per child (or $10,732 for
two children, as assumed in the model).
The distribution of male earnings Gm(y) is (truncated) log normal. The 2000 Census
data on male earnings yields a mean of 10.44 and a standard deviation of 0.687. We
truncate at two standard deviations from the mean, so that y = $9, 608 and y = $157, 192
per annum, and renormalize the probability weights accordingly. Gf (α) is also truncated
log normal distribution where we assume that women have the same distribution of
abilities as men, but deflated by parameter γ > 1. Thus if all women invest in education,
equal opportunities implies women enjoy the same distribution of wages.
Education cost c is set at $57,069. This includes both the tuition fee of attending
a four-year program in a public university and foregone labor income while attending
college. The National Center for Education Statistics states the average annual cost for
undergraduate tuition and fees in public institutions offering a four-year degree between
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2000 and 2003 was $3,967 (ranging between $3,501 and $4,587). The total average cost
over the four-year period is therefore $15,869. The foregone earnings are estimated as
the Federal Minimum Wage ($5.15 per hour in 2000) multiplied by 2000 hours of full-
time work per year. This yields estimate $10,300 per year, or $41,200 over a four-year
period.15 The figure in Table 1 is thus the sum of the direct cost ($15,869) and the
opportunity cost ($41,200).
The distribution of female charm is assumed to be orthogonal to the distribution of
female abilities.16 As there is no objective information on the distribution of charm n in
the population (Buss 2003), we suppose there are just two levels n ∈ {−n, n}, which is
symmetrically distributed and so n also describes the standard deviation of charm across
single women. We use L to label women with charm n = −n < 0, and H to label those
with charm n = n > 0.
The distribution of idiosyncratic (match specific) draws, H(·), is assumed to be
N(µ, σ2). Again, noting that (F − u − µ) describes the expected net increase in flow
utility through starting a family, we normalise µ =0.
The official income equivalence scale for a married couple with two children is 2.1
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008): that is, a couple
raising two children on joint income 2.1Y enjoy the same consumption lifestyle as a
single on income Y . In our model specification this is equivalent to setting β = 0.48. As
a robustness check, we have also allowed the calibration to choose β as a free parameter.
Doing this yields estimated β = 0.51. This parameter plays a major role in determining
equilibrium match formation for we find a small change in β has a significant impact on
the quality of fit. We therefore describe the calibration results with β at its optimised
value of 0.51 rather than the OECD suggested figure of 0.48. The results, however, are
qualitatively identical.
Targets and Identification
The remaining model parameters (λ, F, σ, n, γ) are chosen so that the model outcomes
are consistent with a number of empirical moments. The first target moment is the
fraction of all women aged 25–34 in the 2000 Census who have a university qualification,
which is equal to 25.5%. This target moment ties down the return to education, γ.
15An alternative measure of the opportunity cost comes from the 2000 U.S. Census, according to
which the mean earnings of female high-school (including GED) graduates aged 18–21 are $9,042, which
become $36,168 over four years. Using this alternative measure does alter our results.
16Although Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find evidence of a positive impact of workers’ physical
looks on their earnings, we simplify by abstracting from this effect.
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The second target moment ensures the model outcome is consistent with observed
marital sorting. Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005) use the correlation between
spouses’ years of schooling to identify marital sorting. Across 34 countries, they find
this correlation ranges between 0.32 (Australia) and 0.76 (Colombia), with an average
of 0.60.17 For post-marital earnings, Jacquemet and Robin (2012) report a correlation
between spousal wages of 0.30 using data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation, while Hess (2004) reports a correlation of 0.22 using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Here we instead target the correlation of pre-marital
incomes across matched partners. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and the British Household Panel Survey, the estimated correlation between partner pre-
marital wages (y, w) range between 0.45 and 0.53. We thus set a target equal to 0.5.
This target ties down the calibrated value of σ, the standard deviation of match draws,
for a larger σ implies that types seek more their idiosyncratic “true loves” which reduces
sorting by earnings.
The third set of target moments uses the estimated female hazard rates into first
partnership by age and education where, to reflect recent trends, we use entry into
first partnership rather than entry into first marriage as our measure of the timing of
partnership formation. This is useful identifying information for two reasons. First,
the average rate of entry into first partnership across education categories ties down
the calibrated values for λ and F . Second, unobserved heterogeneity leads to decreasing
hazard functions, where the rate at which the hazard function decreases with age depends
on the dispersion in underlying female attributes. Furthermore, because it is the higher
ability women who invest in education, we show how the difference in the levels and
slopes of the estimated hazard functions (by education category) identifies the separate
impact and relative importance of ability α and charm n on female match outcomes.
Using standard life table analysis (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002), we estimate female
hazard rates into first partnership by age and education category using the 2002–2003
NSFG data. Figure 2 plots the results. Not surprisingly, the hazard function for high-
school dropouts peaks at an earlier age (23 years) relative to the peak age for college
educated women (25 years). These peaks correspond well to first birth activity: con-
ditional on having at least one child, the average age at first birth is 23.3 years for
low educated women and 28.4 years for college graduates. To mitigate non-stationarity
17Using census data, Greenwood et al. (2016) report a correlation coefficient between husband’s and
wife’s education levels that goes from 0.41 in 1960 to 0.52 in 2005.
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problems due to declining female fertility by age, we do not consider empirical hazard
functions beyond age 30.
In a labor market context, Lise and Robin (2014) and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers
(2016) also use indirect inference on hazard functions to identify unobserved heterogene-
ity. In a marriage market context, however, there is an additional identification issue: we
have no information regarding when a single woman begins to seek a long term partner.
For example, Figure 2 reveals that some low-educated women at age 18 enter a long
term relationship, which is clearly not the case for women who invest in education. The
obvious interpretation is that college students delay search for permanent partners until
after they complete their studies, e.g. Goldin and Katz (2002) and Lundberg and Pollak
(2013). As the model can only be consistent with decreasing hazard functions, however,
we operationalise the approach by using as target moments the estimated hazard func-
tions following their peak values (see Table 2). In other words, we assume uneducated
women begin to seek long-term partners at age 23, two years before educated women. A
key feature of these targets, then, is that the hazard rates into first partnership by low-
educated women are initially higher but fall more quickly with duration on the singles
market.
The calibration thus chooses parameters (λ, F, σ, n, γ) to minimise the following
weighted loss function
L(λ, F, σ, n, γ) =
[
pi − 0.255
0.255
]2
+
[
ρ̂− 0.5
0.5
]2
+
1∑
e=0
5∑
a=1
[
ĥe(a)− he(a)
he(a)
]2
,
where pi is the model predicted equilibrium fraction of women who invest in education,
ρ̂ is the model predicted equilibrium correlation of pre-marital incomes across matched
partners, and ĥe(a) is the model predicted average hazard rate into first partnership
by women in education category e = {0, 1}, given duration a on the singles market,
computed as
ĥe(a) =
Σiµ
e
ie
−hiahi
Σiµeie
−hia ,
where µei is the number (measure) of single females of type i who choose education
e = {0, 1}, and hi is their equilibrium hazard rate into partnership.
Results
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Table 3 reports our inferred parameter values. Estimated λ implies a contact rate of 8
potential partners a year, a rate which is reasonable once it is understood that most such
contacts are unsuitable and quickly terminated. The inference is that hazard rates into
first partnership are low not because frictions are inordinately high, but rather because
singles are highly selective and a match requires a double coincidence of wants.
Because the family tax 1 − β is large, the imputed return to raising a family, F =
$31, 000 per annum, is large to compensate. The estimated return to education, 4.7%,
precisely yields the target female education rate of 25.5%. This latter estimate is very
close to the average returns to education found in all the twins studies reviewed by Card
(1999).18
The estimated standard deviation of love draws, σ = $8, 300 per year, precisely yields
the target for sorting by pre-marital wages. Although the estimated σ is non-zero and
so idiosyncratic match draws play a role, σ is much smaller than the estimated standard
deviation of female charm n = $25, 900. This inference arises because the target hazard
function for uneducated women (e = 0) is steeply declining with duration, where large
idiosyncratic match draws, and thus more random matching, would instead yield a flat
hazard function. The resulting interpretation is that male match preferences are much
more affected by female charm than by idiosyncratic love draws.
The target hazard function for educated women (e = 1) is instead comparatively flat.
So why for educated women would charm seem to play a less important role? Figure
3 describes the (model) female hazard rates hj(α) decomposed by ability α and charm
j = L,H. On the figure we also mark the ability thresholds, αL, αH, where women with
charm j = L,H invest in education if and only if their ability α ≥ αj. This figure
reveals that dispersion in charm leads to much wider dispersion in match rates across
uneducated (sufficiently low ability) women than across educated women, and it is this
feature of the model which generates a steep hazard function for types e = 0 and a flat
one for types e = 1. But why does this arise?
Charm and ability generate very different match incentives for single women, and
an interaction effect finds charm is much less valuable to higher ability women. Note
this cannot occur in a frictionless stable matching environment with transferable utility,
because there women receive a transfer payment from men which fully compensates
the value of their charm n. But in an NTU framework with search frictions, a more
18This is also in line with the estimates reported in discrete choice dynamic programming models,
such as Eckstein and Wolpin (1989).
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charming woman can only extract greater surplus from the marriage market by being
suitably selective over potential partners. As charm does not pay the bills while single,
the more charming woman has the incentive to match relatively quickly: by attracting
more male proposals, the calibrated model finds H-type women unambiguously match
more quickly at every ability level. A single woman on a higher wage also finds her
higher fitness attracts more male proposals, but she in addition enjoys a higher quality
lifestyle while single and faces “family tax” (1-β)w to forming a partnership. In general,
the impact of higher w on female match rates is ambiguous.19 The critical property
of the calibrated model is that the impact of charm on the match rates of high ability
women is small: high earning single women find the added value of charm (which attracts
more potential partners) is of relatively little consequence given they are already highly
selective over potential male partners. We discuss further the value of charm below. But
because charm has lower impact on female match rates for types e = 1, the resulting
e = 1 hazard function is comparatively flat.
Table 2 reports the target hazard functions by education e and normalised age (du-
ration on the singles market) and the fitted hazard function using model generated data.
The calibrated model successfully replicates that the hazard function of low educated
women is initially higher and falls steeply with time on the market, while the hazard
function is comparatively flat for college educated women. The fit is not perfect how-
ever: the model female hazard for uneducated women is not steep enough. This could be
improved by further increasing n, the standard deviation of charm, but this also requires
decreasing F to keep the average hazard constant for types e = 0. The trade-off for
the overall fit, however, is that the female hazard for educated women is already too
low, and decreasing F would reduce it even further. Of course, improving the fit would
be possible by introducing an additional free parameter. For example, we could allow
highly educated women to have an additional payoff through matching. Given male
income y is empirically positively correlated with male education, a natural way would
be to introduce match payoffs whereby educated women have an additional payoff by
matching with educated men (see Greenwood et al. 2016).
19For the parameterised model the match rates of H-charm women fall steeply with wages (i.e., the
selection effect always dominates) while the match rates of L-charm women are not monotonic in ability
(i.e., the selection effect only dominates at sufficiently high wages).
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3.3 Comparative Statics and Discussion
Given the above parameter values, we now assess the impact of equal opportunities and
advances in contraceptive technologies on female labor market and marital outcomes.
We also describe their impact on female welfare by type.
The Impact of Equal Opportunities: Data and Model Insights.
There is clear empirical evidence that the removal of marriage bars in the teaching and
clerical professions had a major effect on female labor supply. For example, in 1920 only
one in ten of all married women in the labor force were teachers or clerical workers. By
1970 that proportion had risen to 40% (Goldin 1991). Figure 1 describes the employment
rates of all women aged 25–34 depending on their marital status and motherhood. Single
(never married) women in this age group have always had relatively high labor market
participation rates (around 80% since 1940). But beginning in the early 1950s, there is
a dramatic surge in the labor market participation rates of young married women, and
especially those with children. Given the Goldin (1991) statistic reported above, the
arrival of equal opportunities clearly led to many women with children holding on to
their teaching and clerical jobs.
Given mothers could now continue in their careers, equal opportunities radically
changed the female return to a college education: rather than anticipating to be in the
labor market for only a few years while single and childless, young women might expect
a lifelong return to investing in a qualification. Over the period 1940–2009, Figure 4
reports the fraction of women aged 25–34 with a college education and so describes the
average education choice of women in the 15–24 age group made in the previous decade.
With rational expectations, Figure 1 also describes female expectations of future labor
market participation rates when married with children. As higher participation rates
increase the return to education, more women naturally choose to invest in a costly
education. Taken together, Figures 1 and 4 demonstrate the coincident increases in
female education and employment following the 1950s.
The model is fully consistent with this view of the data. According to the model and
prior to the arrival of equal opportunities, married women with children could only earn
low wages y in the labor market. With sufficiently high child care costs φ > y, married
women withdrew from the labor market to become homemakers. Anticipating such a
future, young women had little incentive (none in the model) to invest in a costly college
education and female education rates are correspondingly small (zero in the model). In
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the corresponding marriage market, male match preferences were then largely driven
by female charm. For the above parameters with unequal opportunities, equilibrium
matching yields (annuitized) female values rVH = $62, 570 and rVL = $23, 144 which
depend on charm type j = L,H but are independent of female ability. The charm
premium, defined as ψ ≡ r[VH − VL]/2, then measures the flow benefit to a single
woman by having high charm n = n relative to mean charm n = 0. Although this
charm premium is substantial, ψ = $19,713 per annum, it is substantially less than
the competitive charm premium n = $25, 900 that would be obtained in a frictionless
TU framework. Instead NTU and search frictions find charming women only extract
a fraction ψ/n =76% of the marital surplus generated by their charm, and do so by
being suitably selective over potential partners rather than by receiving explicit utility
transfers.
The arrival of equal opportunities directly increases the labor market participation
rates of women with children, which then has a large effect on female education rates (the
parameter values ensure 25.5% of women attend college). Although the large majority
of women are made better off by the arrival of equal opportunities, the bottom 18% of
L-type women by ability are worse off, as are the bottom 24% of H-types. For these
women, equal opportunities in the labor market offer little benefit. They are made worse
off because male marital preferences move against them: the increase in fitness across
higher ability women makes men more selective in the marriage market and it becomes
harder for low ability women to attract desirable male partners.
The arrival of equal opportunities also changes the value of charm to women. For
the highest ability women, equal opportunities implies the charm premium becomes
very small: ψ(α) = $7, 670  n, a figure which is also dwarfed by the size of their
earnings ($157,000 at the very top end). The reason for this fall in the charm premium
is that high wage women are already highly selective in the singles market and for them,
added charm, which attracts even more male attention, is of little value. In contrast,
for the lowest ability women, the charm premium increases to ψ(α)=$22,776. Charm,
thus, becomes more valuable to low ability women who find it more difficult to attract
desirable partners.
The Impact of Improved Contraception
According to the model and prior to the arrival of equal opportunities, women had
no (or very little) incentive to invest in a college education. Given that, it follows an
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improved contraceptive technology, by itself, could not have a significant impact on
female education rates. There is some empirical support for this view. As mentioned
in the Introduction, a new latex technology which dramatically affected the production
and usage of condoms among Americans in the 1920s and 1930s, had no significant
impact on female education rates and economic activity. Going even further back in
time, the invention of vulcanized rubber in 1844, which not only resulted in cheaper and
more reliable condoms but also fuelled the production of diaphragms and other barrier
methods, also had no effect on female economic activity (Guinnane 2011). Absent of
equal opportunities it would seem unlikely that the advent of the pill, by itself, would
have had a large impact on female education rates.
As discussed in Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006 and 2010), identifying
the impact of the pill on female economic behavior is difficult for its advent coincided
precisely with the arrival of equal opportunities for women. The view here is that the
impact of the pill is best understood as an interaction effect: given the arrival of equal
opportunities, how then did the pill innovation additionally increase female education
rates?
Goldin and Katz (2002) argue that improved contraception raises u (the flow payoff
of being single) which, by increasing female incentives to delay marriage, then encour-
ages more single women to invest in a college education. Suppose then a contraceptive
innovation increases u. Recall that agent α = αj with j = L,H describes the marginal
investor. As the marginal investor behaves optimally then, ceteris paribus, the Envelope
Theorem implies an increase in u raises her value of being single in proportion to the
time she expects to remain single. The impact of increased u on her return to education
is therefore proportional to the difference in her expected time to marriage across those
respective choices e = {0, 1}.
Figure 3 describes the equilibrium hazard rates into first partnership by charm and
ability for the calibrated model. The figure reveals that the switch to e = 1 at α = αL, αH
yields only a very small decrease in matching rates. The education switch to e = 1
increases male proposal propensities (her fitness z increases) which tends to increase her
match rate, but the family tax means she also becomes more selective. In general the net
effect is ambiguous, the calibrated model finds the net effect is small: for the marginal
investor, an investment in education has only a very small impact on marriage rates.
Thus for the marginal investor, an increase in u has only a very small impact on her
return to education.
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There are, however, additional equilibrium effects. Because improved contraception
raises the flow return to being single, singles will tend to become more selective which
makes members of the opposite sex worse off. This potentially increases the return to
education, for education is one way by which a woman can increase her fitness and
so increase male proposal propensities. For the calibrated model, therefore, Table 4
describes the comparative static of increasing u (reported as dollar per week) on female
education rates.
The comparative static finds an increase in u has a small but negative impact on
education rates among L-charm women, and almost no effect on H-charm women. This
is not entirely surprising: it is unlikely that something which raises the value of leisure
while single relative to being married, could have a large, positive impact on educational
investment. Only once u is extraordinarily large (u = $640 per week) does the model
find that education rates begin to increase with u.
For the pill to have had any effect on female education rates, its impact then must
instead be through subsidising the (psychic) cost c of education. Such an argument is
not straightforward, however, because attending college is not a prerequisite for using
the pill. Even if it is the case that the pill makes single life more fun relative to being
married, it does so both for those who attend college and those who do not, and so is
not necessarily an education subsidy.
One approach is to argue that, in the 1960s and early 1970s, it might have been easier
(or less embarrassing) to obtain the pill from the campus doctor than from the family
doctor. Furthermore, as university life typically implies spending time further away
from family constraints, the advent of the pill might have made singlehood relatively
more enjoyable if lived on campus. The available data are consistent with this line of
argument: using a sample of women aged 18–21 in the 1973 National Survey of Family
Growth (NSFG73), finds that about 50% of the women who stopped their education
with high school or lower qualifications used the pill, while almost 63% of those who
continued into college did so.20
An alternative argument is that women who attend college must instead defer part-
nership search. According to the calibrated model, a type (α, j) with j ∈ {L,H} who
chooses e = 0 and immediately enters the singles market enjoys value Vj(α). Suppose
20Repeating the exercise with data from the NSFG76 leads to virtually the same results. This evidence
is consistent with that presented by Goldin and Katz (2002, Figures 1 and 2).
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instead she chooses e = 1 and enjoys payoff
−c+ u
r
[
1− e−4r]+ e−4rVj(λα),
where over four years she enjoys flow u while single in college but cannot search for a
long term partner until after graduation. Arranging terms appropriately, the marginal
investor αj is then identified by
c+
[
rVj(αj)− u
](1− e−4r
r
)
= e−4r
[
Vj(λαj)− Vj(αj)
]
. (22)
The right hand side describes the return to education and the above discussion has es-
tablished, for the marginal investor, that this return changes very little with u. The left
hand side of (22) is the cost of education where the second term describes the opportu-
nity cost of delayed marital search. As the flow surplus to marital search [rVj(αj)− u]
decreases with u, it then follows that an increase in u reduces the (real) cost of education.
This term thus captures Goldin and Katz’s (2002) notion that increasing u reduces the
cost of deferred marital search.
To evaluate how large such cost subsidies need to be to generate significant effects
on female education rates, we consider the simpler first argument: that the gross cost of
education is C = c − uC [1 − e−4r]/r, where uC represents the added flow value to have
better access to the pill while studying at college and while away from parental influence.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 5. The estimates demonstrate that rel-
atively small subsidies (of the order of 4–5% of the total educational cost) can have large
effects on college education rates. This evidence is in line with the economic literature
that shows that small (parental) transfers are also likely to substantially increase col-
lege enrolment (Keane and Wolpin 2001; Cameron and Taber 2004). Thus given equal
opportunities, there exist feasible mechanisms by which the contraceptive pill had an
additional impact on female education rates in the 1960s and early 1970s.
4. Conclusion
This paper has developed a new equilibrium marriage model of two-sided search where
ex-ante heterogenous individuals have general payoff functions with vectors of attributes.
The approach is powerful for it identifies a simple algorithm which, in the numerical
application, is found to rapidly converge to equilibrium. Using indirect inference with
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target moments including female hazard rates into first partnership by age and education
choice, the empirical section identifies the different impacts of female ability and charm on
female match incentives. Because the arrival of equal opportunities for women increased
female wages but arguably had little impact on the value of other female attributes,
the paper identifies how such opportunities had far-reaching consequences for women
both in the labor and marriage markets and their associated welfare implications across
heterogeneous types.
Although the focus of the application has been on the marriage market with non-
transferable utility, the formal analysis also applies to a labor market context with wage
bargaining. Of course a steady state equilibrium in a labor market framework not only
requires solving for the matching equilibrium, as done here, but the steady state dis-
tribution of types is endogenously determined depending on the inflows and outflows of
trading agents. Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999) show why that extended approach gen-
erates additional sorting externalities, since agent match strategies then affect the steady
state composition of singles, and how such feedback effects may then generate multiple
equilibria. In numerical work, updating the type distribution by solving standard steady
state flow conditions is not a difficult computational problem (e.g., Greenwood et al.
[2016] among many others). Of course such composition effects also arise in a marriage
market context when fertility is a choice. For example, Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi
(2015) find that more educated women are more likely to remain childless. In our frame-
work this is consistent with a sorting explanation: educated women who anticipate not
having children (i.e., they have a low family payoff Fi) participate more in the labor
market and so have a greater return to educational investment.
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Appendix
Data Sources
Our data sources, which we use for the discussion in the Introduction and the numerical
exercise in Section 3, come from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of
the decennial censuses (Ruggles et al. 2010) and the National Survey of Family Growth
(NSFG).
IPUMS — We use decennial censuses from 1850 to 2000 (1890 is missing), and the
2009 American Community Survey sample, which is a 1% national random sample of
the population. Detailed information on education, which is grouped in 12 different
categories in the variable EDUC, is not available before the 1940 Census. Data on labor
force participation come from the variable LABFORCE and cover all census years with
the exception of 1850, in which the information for women is not recorded. For our
analysis we select only women who are aged between 25 and 34 for the education and
labor market statistics. The sample size therefore varies across censuses and outcomes.
Sample sizes for Figures 1 and 4 therefore vary from about 20,000 women in 1860 to
about 1 million in 2000.
Figure 1 shows the trends in the proportion of women aged 25–34 who are in paid
employment, expressed in percentage terms. Unemployed women and women who are out
of the labor force in that age range are in the base category. Besides all women, the figure
also shows the trends for mothers and for women who are single and never married.21
The red vertical lines are drawn in correspondence of the diffusion of birth technology
improvements. That is, the 1860 line corresponds to vulcanized rubber condoms, which
followed the invention of vulcanized rubber in 1844 and its application to the production
of condoms in 1855 (Guinnane 2011); the 1940 line represents the 1936 legalization
of contraceptive use for family planning, which followed the introduction of the latex
technology in 1919; the 1965 and 1980 lines capture the diffusion of the pill, which after
the introduction of Enovid in 1960 took time before a full liberalization of access to oral
contraception (Goldin and Katz 2002; Bailey 2006, 2010).
Figure 4 shows the proportion of women aged 25–34 who have a university degree or
higher qualification. The vertical lines are drawn in correspondence of 1940 (legalization
of condom use for family planning), 1965 and 1980 (diffusion of the pill).
Finally, data on male earnings come the 2000 Census and are computed using the
variable INCWAGE. The statistics reported in the text (Table 1) are calculated on all
males born between 1951 and 1960 (hence aged 40–49 in 2000) after dropping the top
and bottom 1% of the distribution of INCWAGE out of the analysis.
NSFG — Our analysis uses Cycles 1–7 collected by the National Center for Health
Statistics in 1973, 1976, 1982, 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2006–2010. Each sample contains
information on women aged 15–44.
The surveys for cycles 1–5 (up to 1995) were based on personal interviews conducted
in the homes of a national sample of women in the civilian, noninstitutionalized popu-
lation of the United States. The main purpose of the 1973–1995 surveys was to provide
reliable national data on marriage, divorce, contraception, infertility, and the health of
21Because data on marital status are available only since the 1880 census and not before, the employ-
ment series for single, never married women can only be constructed from that year onwards.
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women and infants. Cycles 1 and 2 (1973 and 1976) collected information only on cur-
rently or formerly married females, so they do not allow us to construct series for single,
never married women.
Cycle 6 (2002), in which both men and women were interviewed, was based on an
area probability sample. The sample represents the household population of the United
States, 15–44 years of age. The survey sample is designed to produce national data, not
estimates for individual states. In-person interviews were completed with 7,643 female
respondents (and 4,928 males). The response rate was 79% overall — 80% for females
and 78% for males. Cycle 7 (2006–2010) is similar to cycle 6, except that interviews in
this case were done 48 weeks of every year for 4 years, from June 2006 through June
2010. This cycle interviewed a nationally representative sample of 22,682 women and
men 15–44 years of age living in households in the United States.
Each cycle contains direct information on each of the variables of interest (education,
and labor force participation) in all data collection years. As in the case of IPUMS,
sample sizes vary across outcomes and cycles, ranging from about 2,000 women in cycle
6 to about 4,400 women in cycle 7. As mentioned, because cycles 1 and 2 did not sample
never married women, the employment rate series in Figure 1 and the education rate
series in Figure 4 for this group of women start only from cycle 3 (1982). Using the
NSFG 2002-2003 cycle on all women aged 14 to 44, Figure 2 shows the distribution
of the age at first partnership by education type. These statistics were obtained from
life table analysis (Kalbeisch and Prentice 2002) on a total sample of more than 7,500
women.
The baseline parameters reported in Table 1 and used in the calibration analysis are
standard. One note on the way we have computed the full cost of education, c, is in
order. The source is the National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of
Education (http://inces.ed.gov) Digest of Education Statistics: 2013. According to this
source, the average annual cost for undergraduate tuition and fees in public institutions
offering a 4-year degree calculated between 2000 and 2003 is $3,967.25 in current dollars
(with values ranging from $3,501 to $4,587). The corresponding total over the 4-year
period is $15,869. (The same annual statistic including room and board is $9,575 for a
total over the 4-year period of $38,300.) Our measure of opportunity cost is based on the
Federal Minimum Wage in 2000 of $5.15 per hour (source: U.S. Department of Labor,
History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938
2009, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm). Assuming 2000 hours per year for
a full time worker (40 weekly hours over 50 weeks in a year), total annual earning will
be $10,300, which over 4 years become $41,200. Summing up this and the direct cost
of education leads to a total of $57,069 over four years. An alternative measure of the
opportunity cost is given by the observed average earnings for women of all races, who
high-school graduates (including GED) and aged 18–21. This figure is $9,042 (s.d. =
$11,076) from the U.S. Census 2000. Over the 4-year period, this translates to $36,168,
which summed up to the direct cost of education becomes $52,037. We have performed
the analysis using this new estimate, but all our results remain unchanged. Finally, we
have also performed the analysis using the figure for the cost of education that includes
room and board. This is $79,500 over the 4-year period. Again, all the results of the
paper are qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameters and Functional Forms
r 0.04 (per year)
u 0
φ $10,732 (per year)a
β 0.51
Gm(y) Truncated lognormal, with µm = $10.440 and σm = $0.687
b
[y, y] [9,608, 157,192] ($ per year)b
Gf (α|n) Gm(·) rescaled by γ
Gf (n|α) Symmetric binomial, with draws from {−n, n}
c $57,069 (over 4 years)c
a Source: Macartney and Laughlin (2011).
b Values are from the 2000 U.S. Census.
c The values are computed using information on average annual cost for undergraduate tuition and fees
in public institutions from the National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education,
Digest of Education Statistics: 2013 (http://inces.ed.gov), information on the Federal Minimum Wage
in 2000 from the U.S. Department of Labor, History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 1938 2009 (http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm), and information on
earnings of female high school graduates from the 2000 U.S. Census.
Table 2: Hazards to First Partnership by Education (Target and Model)
Normalized Age
Hazard 0 (peak) 1 2 3 4
huT (target, e = 0) 0.197 0.154 0.115 0.102 0.088
ĥu (model, e = 0) 0.187 0.164 0.142 0.121 0.103
heT (target, e = 1) 0.163 0.153 0.149 0.144 0.143
ĥe (model, e = 1) 0.145 0.142 0.138 0.135 0.131
Note: hjT and ĥ
j are the model (theoretical) and the target (empirical) hazards, respectively, for j = u, e.
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Table 3: Calibration Results
Parameter Estimate
λ 7.86
F $31,000
σ $8,300
n $25,900
γ 1.047
Note: All estimates are yearly values, except for γ.
Table 4: Education Choice as the Flow Payoff of Being Single Changes, by Charm
Type
College Education Rate
u ($ per week) L-Types H-Types
0 0.294 0.217
20 0.292 0.217
40 0.290 0.218
80 0.280 0.218
160 0.263 0.219
320 0.263 0.227
640 0.277 0.238
Note: The flow payoff of being single, u, is expressed in dollars per week.
Table 5: Educational Investment by Charm Type
Education Cost Net Subsidy, uC College Education Rate
($ per year) ($ per week) L-Types H-Types
41,200 0 0.277 0.233
43,280 –10 0.211 0.211
45,360 –20 0.171 0.191
47,440 –30 0.150 0.172
49,520 –40 0.130 0.161
Note: University education and costs are assumed to be spread over 52 weeks × 4 years.
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Figure 1: Female Employment Rate, Women aged 25–34
Sources: IPUMS Census 1860–2000, 2009 ACS sample; NSFG, Cycles 1-7.
Note: The vertical lines indicate the birth cohorts of women who had greater exposure to birth tech-
nology improvements. See the Data Appendix for a description of the data and variables used.
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Figure 2: Observed Female Hazards to First Partnership by Education
Source: NSFG 2002-2003, all women aged 14–44.
Note: The vertical lines are drawn at the age where the hazard functions peak and four years later for
college educated women (solid line) and high-school dropouts (dashed line).
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Figure 3: Female Hazards to First Partnership by Ability and Charm Type
Note: The solid vertical line marks the ability threshold for H-charm women, αH = $55, 400, while the
dashed vertical line marks the ability threshold for L-charm women, αL = $47, 200.
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Figure 4: Fraction of Female College Graduates, Women aged 25–34
Note: See sources and note to Figure 1.
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